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MANUFACTURER RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRICES UNDER
SECTION 2(a) OF ROBINSON-PATMAN: ARE SOME
RETAILERS MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS?
SECTION 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits sellers from discrimi-
nating among purchasers when "such discrimination may [tend] ... substan-
tially to lessen competition .... I" Difficulty in determining legitimate prices
within this imprecise language is aggravated by the conflicting nature of under-
lying legislative policies.2 The act's proponents sought primarily to protect in-
dependent distributors from the competitive advantages enjoyed by chain stores
securing special purchase discounts.3 As a concession to distributive efficiency,
however, Congress allowed sellers to grant discounts justified by lower servic-
1. Section 2(a) of the act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where
such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States . ..
and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them ...." 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1952).
2. Critics have frequently described the act as ambiguous. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REC.
9419 (1936) (the bill "contains many inconsistencies, and the courts will have the devil's
own job to unravel the tangle"). See also Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61,
65 (1953) ("precision of expression is not an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-
Patman Act"); Ruberoid Co. v. FTC, 189 F.2d 893, 894-95 (2d Cir. 1951); AusriN,
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 5
(rev. ed. 1953) (hereinafter cited as AUSTIN) ; McLaughlin, The Courts and the Robinson-
Patmnan Act: Possibilities of Strict Construction, 4 LAw & CONTEmP. PRO=. 410, 413
(1937) ; 57 COLUm. L. Rav. 429, 430 (1957).
3. When he introduced the act in the House of Representatives, Rep. Patman said:
"This bill is designed to . .. piotect the independent merchant . . . from exploitation
by his chain competitor." 79 CONG. Rac. 9078 (1935). See also S. REP. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936). For congressional history of the act, and purposes of its
sponsors, see Zoaw & FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE N-w PRICE LAws 51-56 (1937)
(hereinafter cited as ZoRN & FELDMAN) ; cf. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43
(1948) (act's objective to deprive large buyer of purchasing advantage); Morton &
Cotton, Robinso-Patman Act-Anti-Trust or Anti-Consuner?, 37 MINN. L. REv. 227,
228 (1953) (act helps wholesale grocer against chain store); Rahl, Antitrust Policy in
Distribution, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 185, 188 (1955) (act's purpose to penalize integrated
buyer) ; Rose, The Right of a Businessiman To Lower the Price of His Goods, 4 VAND.
L. REv. 221, 238, 253 (1951) (act is anti-chain).
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ing costs. 4 Faced with the need of reconciling these objectives in order to
enable businessmen to price without undue fear of penalty, courts have devised
standards fostering administrative predictability. 5 Thus, the "competitors price
rule" stipulates that different prices to buyers competing in the sale of goods
constitute, prima facie, unlawful discrimination.6 By requiring the same price
to all competitors irrespective of the value of the economic function which
4. "[N]othing ... shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods
or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered . . ."
49 STAT. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952). See 80 CoNG. RJc. 9417 (1936) (cost justification
defense assures mass distributor "full protection in the use and rewards of efficient methods
in ... distribution in return for depriving him of the right to crush his efficient smaller
competitors with the power and resources of mere size") ; Rahl, mpra note 3, at 211 ("con-
cession to efficiency"). See also REPORT OF TrE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COM-
MITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 170, 171 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Arr'y GEN.
RE.); Fuchs, The Requirement of Exactness in the Justification of Price and Service
Differentials Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 30 TEcAS L. Rlv. 1, 4 (1951). Many
authorities feel that the act should go beyond permitting distributive efficiency to the
general promotion of competition under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Automatic Canteen
Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63 (1953); Avr'v GEN. REP. 131. Some commentators feel
that the present interpretation of the act fails to promote Sherman Act competition. See,
e.g., Correa, Discrimination in Prices, in How To COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAvs
152, 172 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954); Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and
Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 970, 974-75 (1951).
Possibly, however, the act, by keeping individual competitors in business, prevents
monopoly and maintains competition. See Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 197, 198 (1954).
On the aims of the act generally, see Note, 66 YALE L.J. 243, 244 n.6 (1956) (collecting
authorities).
5. The need for predictability under the act is generally acknowledged. See Ruberoid
Co. v. FTC, 189 F.2d 893, 894-95 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Smith, The Patinan Act in Practice, 35
MicH. L. REv. 705, 729 (1937) ; Legis. Note, 50 HARv. L. REv. 106, 113 (1936).
6. The "competitors price rule" has never been judicially formulated as such, but con-
stituted the ratio decidendi of the following cases. Danko v. Shell Oil Co., 115 F. Supp.
886 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) (allegation that lower price to gas station owned, operated and
maintained by seller who also sold to plaintiff station ground for § 2(a) suit) ; Ruberoid
Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (9th ed., orders) ff 14313, at 12,488 (1950) (FTC cease and de-
sist order stating: "The fundamental and controlling factor... is that the record establishes
price discriminations by respondent among purchasers who are in fact competing with
one another in the resale of the products") ; American Art Clay Co., 38 F.T.C. 463, 467
(1944) (10% extra discount to certain distributors labeled "wholesalers" and "jobbers"
illegal where buyers are in active competition with other customers not receiving such
discount); Sherwin Williams Co., 36 F.T.C. 25, 61, 65-66 (1943) (violation of § 2(a)
for respondent to give combined wholesaler-retailer functional discount on goods sold
directly to consumers in competition with retailers who purchased from respondent);
C. F. Sauer Co., 33 F.T.C. 812, 825 (1941) (where two purchasers were chain retailer
and independent retail grocer, seller was liable for selling to chain at 304 less than the
independent) ; United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489, 1501 (1939) (held illegal for
respondent to sell through wholly owned retail stores to consumers at less than the price
to retailers competing for sales to the same consumers) ; see also Kraft-Phenix Cheese
Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937) (concerned with the effect of price differentials on com-
petition between favored and unfavored retailers reselling Kraft products); cf. Krug v.
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each performs for the seller, this rule can promote inefficient marketing.7
Courts could eliminate the rule's adverse economic effects by construing the
act's secondary policy-approving cost-motivated discounts-as allowing differ-
entials in seller expenses to justify price discrimination. In practice, however,
courts narrowly restrict the cost justification defense and hence favor the small
buyer through rigorous application of the competitors price rule.3
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230, 235 (D.N.J. 1956) (wholesaler given
cause of action because of injury to retail competitors).
The competitors price rule is a major component of the judicial interpretation of the
act since most cases under § 2(a) involve price discrimination between two persons on the
same level of distribution, such as two wholesalers or two retailers. See 70 HARv. L. REv. 387
(1956). The rule implements the aim of the act as stated by congressmen and commen-
tators. See, e.g., statement by Rep. Patman, 80 CoNG. REc. 3447 (1935) (the bill would
"put all retail distributors upon the same floor with the same competitive rights");
statement by Rep. Utterback, 80 Cong. Rec. 9416 (1936) (stressing that discrimination is
a price difference between competing buyers); ZORN & FELDMAN 107 ("debates . . .
show that the Act was primarily designed to prohibit differences in price among purchasers
who competed in the resale of the product") ; Van Cise, Functional Prices, in NEw YoRK
STATE BAR Ass'N, 1947 ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SYmPOsium 89, 94 (mail order houses,
chain stores and single retail stores are all retailers selling to consumers, and unless cost
differences or other special factors permit they must receive the same price) ; Kelley, Func-
tional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 526, 546-57 (1952).
The strength of the presumption raised by unequal prices to competitors is uncertain.
Some cases insist that the complainant must also show an injury to competition resulting
from price differentials. Others hold that a difference in price creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption of an adverse effect on competition. See Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d
378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945) (taking the latter view) ; see also Rowe,
The Evolution of the Robinson-Patnui Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 COLUm.
L. Rwv. 1059, 1076-85 (1957) (citing cases and discussing both views).
7. See Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinsohn-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L. REv. 3, 4
(1953) (act enforces discrimination against lower cost method of distribution); Kelley,
supra note 6, at 526-28 (efficiency gained through integration is discouraged by allowing
only the retail discount-the difficulty of cost justification "discourages distributional in-
novations") ; Comment, 46 YALE L.J. 447, 455 (1.937) (failure to recognize chain's greater
functions by granting discount to wholesaler performing less functions prevents elimination
of the inefficient wholesaler).
8. A-ry GEN. REP. 170-76 (cost justification illusory); Rahl, supra note 3, at 211
(cost justification has proved a very slight concession to efficiency); Rowe, Price Dis-
crimination., Competition, and Confitsion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE
LJ. 929, 963 (1951) (as a practical matter, cost defense is impossible). One of the principal
arguments supporting the practical unavailability of the defense is that the cost justifi-
cation defense requires an expensive distribution cost accounting system which most
firms do not use. Warmack, Cost Accounting Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
in NEw YORK STATE BAR Ass'N, 1947 ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SYmPOsiUm 105, 106-07;
Adelman, Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General's Report, 104 U. PA.
L. REv. 222, 235 (1955); Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 237, 248 (1954). But see AusTIN
60-61 (necessary accounting not too expensive). Moreover, the defense must be based on
actual, not marginal, cost savings. Note, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1952). Joint costs
such as institutional advertising and charitable contributions are allowable only on a per
unit basis, thus precluding the possibility of justifying a differential. Standard Oil Co., 41
F.T.C. 263 (1945); AusTiN 63; ZORN & FELDMAN 143; see Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1011,
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Equal prices to buyers reselling in the same market are most easily achieved
when competitors purchase directly from the same seller.9 Sales by a supplier
to different distributive levels create problems, however, since the price paid
by the indirect purchaser may differ from that charged the direct purchaser.
For example, when a manufacturer sells directly both to vertically integrated
chain stores and to wholesalers supplying independent retailers, the cost to
the indirect-buying retailers is often different from the cost to the direct-buying
chain. Although frustrating the intended effect of the competitors price rule,
disparity of this sort has been permitted.10 Suit will not lie against the whole-
saler whatever the price structure provided he does not discriminate among
retailing customers.'1 Consequently, the competitors price rule is avoided
unless it is extended to render the manufacturer responsible for prices charged
1014-20 (1952). The burden of proof is on the party claiming the defense. FTC v. Morton
Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44 (1.948). No account is taken of factors which determine price but
do not relate to sale or delivery. ZORN & FELDMAN 119-23 (enumerating various factors
such as securing order at right psychological moment) ; Fuchs, supra note 4, at 7. Indirect
costs are difficult to allocate where the producer manufacturers two or more products. See
Note, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1011, 1014-15 (1952).
A few commentators have argued that cost justification is practicable for the careful
manufacturer. Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1011 (1952); Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 237,
250 (1954).
For collection of cases involving cost justification, see Rowe, Price Differentials and
Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patnan Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1,
23 n.101 (1956).
9. The act makes it "unlawful for any person . . . to discriminate in price between
different purchasers...." 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952). Thus, responsi-
bility for equal prices rests on the seller. Crowley, Equal Price Treatment Under the
Robinson-Patinan Act, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 306, 312 (1947) (interpreting syntax of § 2(a)).
Basic to case law under the act is the rule that a seller discriminating between competing
direct purchasers violates § 2(a). See cases cited note 6 supra.
10. See, e.g., Sherwin Williams, 36 F.T.C. 25, 40-41, 74-75 (1943) ; Albert L. Whiting,
26 F.T.C. 312, 317 (1938). In Sherwin Williams, respondent sold directly to consumers,
retailers, integrated wholesaler-retailers and wholesalers. The seller granted discounts to
the wholesalers and the wholesaler-retailers. The FTC found no violation when the whole-
saler sold to retailers at less than the price respondent charged his direct-buying retailers.
With respect to the sales to the wholesaler-retailer, however, the FTC held that he could
receive a discount on those goods which he wholesaled to retailers, but not on those sold
directly to consumers. In the latter transactions, because the wholesaler-retailer was acting
strictly as a retailer competing with other retailers purchasing from respondent, the price
differential violated the competitors price rule.
In Whiting, discounts were permitted "where, in fact, jobbing services are rendered"
by the wholesaling farm bureaus. 26 F.T.C. at 317. The recipient of the discount could
therefore sell at more or less than the price the direct-buying retailer received from
the seller, thereby defeating the objective of equal prices to competitors. See Shniderman,
"The Tyranny of Labcls"--A Study of Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman
Act, 60 HAR-V. L. REv. 571, 599 n.104 (1947) ; see also notes, 12, 13 infra and accompany-
ing text.
11. Discrimination by a seller is essential to a § 2(a) violation. See note 9 supra.
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indirect-buying retailers.12 On the apparent theory that sales to wholesalers
and chains, distributing on different levels, are sales to noncompetitors, courts
initially refused to hold a manufacturer accountable for any difference between
prices to the chain and those the wholesaler charged his own customers. 13
In the 1949 decision of Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, however, the Seventh Cir-
cuit imposed responsibility on a primary seller for price disparity on subse-
quent distribution levels resulting from unequal prices to immediate pur-
chasers.1 4 The court held that Standard discriminated illegally by granting
wholesalers special discounts which enabled them to resell to indirect-buying
retailers at a price lower than that charged by Standard in its sales to direct-
12. For a discussion of such manufacturer responsibility, see notes 38, 44-47 infra and
accompanying text.
Seller responsibility for prices charged by intermediaries has been strongly criticized:
"[S]uppliers granting functional discounts . . . should not be held responsible for any
consequences of their customers' pricing tactics." An'Y GEN. REP. 208.
13. Dictum in the leading case of Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923), was generally interpreted to allow status discounts. Kelley,
supra note 6, at 531-32. Status discounts are those given solely because of the recipient's
position in the distributive hierarchy rather than because of the services he performs. See
Note, 66 YALE L.J. 243, 244-45 n.9 (1956) (collecting citations). The acceptance of status
discounts was based on the fact that the old Clayton Act, in force at the time of Mcnnen,
forbade discrimination only where competition was injured on the same market level-"to
lessen competition ... in any line of commerce .... ." 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 13 (1952). Mennen indicated that different prices are legal between a wholesaler
and a retailer even if each buys the same quantity of goods. Assuming this to have been
the law under the old Clayton Act, the validity of status discounts after Robinson-Patman
enactment in 1936 is questionable in view of the act's language providing that discrimina-
tion in price is a violation when individual competitors are injured. The FTC permitted
status discounts under § 2(a) on unclear reasoning. See note 10 supra; Note, 66 YAIE L.J.
243, 245 n.10 (1956). On the incompatibility of functional discounts and § 2(a), see
Kelley, supra note 6; Legis. Note, 50 HARv. L. REv. 106 (1936).
Different theories have been advanced to support the legality of status discounts
under Robinson-Patman. One theory, based on Rep. Utterback's statement that no "dis-
crimination" exists under the terms of § 2(a) unless the price differential is between
those in competition, 80 CONG. REC. 9416 (1936), contends that the wholesaler and retailer
are not in competition as defined by Mennen because resale is at different levels. A second
theory focuses on § 2(a) language stating that a violation requires injury to competition,
and concludes that competition has not been injured because the wholesaler and retailer
do not compete. Actually, both theories rely on the basic premise that parties selling at
different levels are not competitors. The major practical difference between the two
theories is that under the former complainant need show only that the parties were
competing, while under the latter he must also show injury to competition. For discussion
of these theories, see ZORN & FELDMAN 170, 171, 173, 176; Shniderman, supra note 10,
at 578 & n.56; Van Cise, supra note 6, at 89, 92-93; Legis. Note, 50 HARv. L. Rv. 106,
113 (1936). For the elements of complainant's case, see note 6 supra.
14. 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951),
reissued with new findings, 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953), set aside, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956),
aff'd, 355 U.S. 396 (1958). For a detailed analysis of the litigation, see McGee, Price Dis-
crimination and Competitive Effects: The Standard Oil of Indiana Case, 23 U. CHI. L.
REv. 398 (1.956) ; Note, 67 HARv. L. REv. 294 (1953).
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buying retailers.'5 As a result, the primary seller was required to price in a
manner which would eliminate cost differences to competing retailers even
though buyers purchasing directly from him were not on the same distributive
level.' 6 The court suggested two ways for the seller to avoid future liability.
He could use refusals-to-deal as a means of forcing wholesalers to charge
indirect-buying retailers a price equaling that granted direct-buying retailers.1 7
Recognizing, perhaps, that such control might violate the Sherman Act,'8 the
15. 173 F.2d at 212. Four large buyers were favored by Standard, one of whom sold
exclusively at retail through his own outlets. The other three sold primarily at wholesale
and occasionally at retail. Id. at 212-13. Other direct buyers from Standard were retail
service stations, more than half of which were owned and leased by Standard. Id. at 212.
16. Id. at 217. See A-r'y GEN. REP. 206; Note, 59 YALE L.J. 158, 160 (1949).
Of the four favored buyers from Standard, two priced in a manner not undercutting the
small direct-buying retailers. The action of the other two led to Standard's liability. One
of them was in fact a large retailer selling through his own outlets, and Standard's discount
to him in effect represented a violation of the competitors price rule. See note 6 supra.
The other price cutter was primarily a wholesaler. 173 F2d at 212-13.
The court impliedly followed the theory expressed in Sherwin-Williams Co., 36 F.T.C.
25 (1943), that the seller does not discriminate when he grants different prices to different
distributive levels, i.e., to direct-buying wholesalers and retailers. See notes 10, 13 sipra.
See also Albert L. Whiting, 26 F.T.C. 312 (1938). The Standard Oil court seemed primarily
interested, however, in consequences on the retail level. The primary seller's liability was
based not only on the fact that different prices were charged direct-buying competitors,
but also on the fact that different prices to noncompetitors-wholesalers and direct-buying
retailers-resulted in inequality to the direct and indirect-buying retailers.
17. 173 F.2d at 217.
18. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952). The Robinson-Patman
Act expressly guarantees to sellers the right of "selecting their own customers in bona
fide transactions and not in restraint of trade . . . ." 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §
13(a) (1952). (Emphasis added.) Absent any conspiracy, combination or monopolistic
purpose, refusal to deal by an individual does not violate the antitrust laws. United States
v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (seller may refuse to sell to a person who will not
maintain resale prices). But -a concerted refusal will not escape prohibition, and the
course of dealing may inferentially show the agreement which was not present in Colgate.
FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (refusal to deal must be viewed
in business perspective); United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
Thus, even individual refusals to deal may be an integral part of a § 1 violation of the
Sherman Act. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723
(1944) ; Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 129 F.2d 651 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 664 (1942). As suggested in the Standard context, refusal
to deal was to be used for the purpose of maintaining resale prices. But Standard and its
wholesalers were in competition with each other, both selling to retailers. Resale price
maintenance is not exempt from § 1 of the Sherman Act if the price setter competes with
the parties whose price he controls. See note 31 infra; Rowe, Price Discriminatn, Con-
petition, and Confion: Another Look at Robinson-Patnn, 60 YALE LJ. 929, 944-45
(1951) ; Note, 59 YALE L.J. 158, 161 n.15 (1949). "In the absence of an operative Fair
Trade exemption, every plan to control resale prices by withholding goods from price
cutters may founder . . . if involving an understanding beyond a naked refusal to deal."
A7Tr' GN. RaP. 136.
Individual refusals to deal may also violate § 2 of the Sherman Act when part of a
scheme to monopolize. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
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court indicated that, alternatively, Standard could comply with Robinson-
Patman by treating wholesalers and direct-buying retailers identically."'
Standard Oil thus endorsed a rule, previously lacking major case law support,
that sales may be lawfully made at a single price to all direct purchasers
regardless of their function or position in the distributive hierarchy.20
While easy to administer,21 this "one-price rule" defeats the principal policy
of the act by failing to achieve equal prices to competitors. Assuming the
primary supplier charges a single price, unless the wholesaler foregoes a mark-
up, his retailer customers face higher prices than their direct-buying com-
petitors.2 2 The one-price rule may also impede distributive efficiency. For
example, whenever wholesalers and integrated retailers paying the same price
relieve the primary seller of different marketing costs, economic discrimination
results.2 Furthermore, even if the combined distributive system of wholesaler
to indirect-buying retailer and the integrated direct-buying retailer discharge
equivalent functions for the seller, the one-price rule fails to ensure that the
(1953) ; Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) ; Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); New Home Appliance Center v.
Thompson, 250 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1957). See, generally, Barber, Refusals To Deal Under
the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847 (1955); Mund, Refitsal To Sell, 11
VAND. L. REV. 339 (1958); Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121 (1949).
19. 173 F.2d at 217.
20. Prior to Standard Oil, the only case supporting the one-price doctrine was a
Federal Trade Commission decision, Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937). Dictum
in FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 757 (1945), involving basing points, may
also be taken as supporting the doctrine. Other language in the Staley case and in com-
panion cases, however, cast doubt on the meaning of the Staley dictum. See 324 U.S. at
756; Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); cf. FTC v. Cement Insti-
tute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) ; AUSTIN 26-36. Some support for the one-price doctrine may be
found in the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act. See S. REP. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
21. See Van Cise, supra note 6, at 92, 94 (because of its administrative certainty,
sellers will prefer charging one price to taking the risk of granting functional discounts).
See also George, Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: The First Year, 4 LAW &
CONvM P. PRoB. 392, 400 (1937) (charging one price is one of the "easiest and surest"
methods of avoiding Robinson-Patman liability).
22. The wholesaler might sell to the retailer at or less than cost if the indirect
retailer had strong bargining power. But this would be the exceptional case and could
occur for only a limited time since wholesalers would be forced out of business. See Note,
67 HARv. L. Ray. 294, 314, 317 (1953) ; 70 HARV. L. Ray. 387, 388 (1956). Usually, the
wholesaler would add a markup to his cost. Shniderman, supra note 10, at 588-89. The
markup might force wholesalers out of business if the retailers buying from them could
not survive. But by taking a lower profit or successfully charging a higher price than
their direct-buying competitors, indirect-buying retailers can remain in business.
23. For the definition of economic discrimination, see note 48 infra.
The wholesaler and direct-buying retailer often do not relieve the seller of economic
functions of equal value. Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion:
Another Look at Robinson-Patinan, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 931 n.11 (1951) (uniform price
often economic discrimination) ; see Rahl, supra note 3, at 218; 57 COLUm. L. REv. 429, 430
(1957); 70 HARv. L. Rv. 387, 390 (1956).
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price to the indirect retailer will reflect the value of his marketing functions.
The wholesaler may fail to pass on to the retailer a discount received from the
primary seller for distributor services actually undertaken by the retailer. Since a
direct-buying chain could obtain the full discount, the excess of the price paid by
the indirect-buying retailer over that paid by the chain may represent more than
the difference in economic worth of the functions which each performs. 2 4 Thus,
the fact that the one-price rule effects neither distributive efficiency nor equal
prices to competitors suggests its limitation to the specific fact situation of
Standard Oil.
2 5
The one-price rule has nevertheless been extended to cover markets in which
the manufacturer controls prices to both direct and indirect retailers. In Klein
v. Lionel Corp.,20 the Third Circuit held seller regulation of prices to an indirect
purchaser irrelevant to the issue of unlawful discrimination.2 7 In that case, the
manufacturer's policy of granting wholesalers and direct-buying retailers the
same price resulted in a higher price to indirect-buying retailers. 28 Relying
24. Of course, if the excess price to the indirect retailer exactly reflects a function
performed by the wholesaler which the chain performs for itself, economic discrimination
does not occur. On the other hand, economic discrimination against the chain or a whole-
saler need not necessarily harm efficiency, for the party against whom discrimination has
occurred may become even more efficient to regain lost profits.
25. For criticism of the one-price rule, see PA~TMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
165-66 (1938) (one price involves injury to customers of the wholesaler) ; Notes, 59 YALE
L. J. 158, 162 (1949), 67 HARV. L. REv. 294, 315 n.94 (1953). One price has been criticized
on the broader level of its general effect on the economy but this criticism does not accept
the basic aim of Robinson-Patman as desirable and applies equally well to any plan de-
signed to protect independent distributors. See Rowe, Price Driscrimination, Competition,
and Confusion: Another Lodk at Robinson-Patinan, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 972, 973 (1951);
Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. Rav. 27 (1949).
26. 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956), 57 COLUm. L. REv. 429 (1957), 25 U. CIN. L. Rev.
537 (1956).
27. 237 F.2d at 15 n.2, 16. The court distinguished two prior FTC cases, Luxor, Ltd.,
31 F.T.C. 658 (1940) ; Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937), holding control
determinative on the superficial ground that they involved cease and desist orders. 237 F.2d
at 15. See also Dentists Supply Co., 37 F.T.C. 345, 348 (1943) ; AusTIN 37. Since control
by the seller over lower distributive levels is the effective lever in granting discriminatory
prices, services and allowances, the Luxor and Kraft-Phenix approach seem applicable to
treble damage suits such as Klein. For a contrary view, see Shniderman, supra note 10,
at 589-90.
For a discussion of FTC policy on control, repudiated by the Third Circuit in Klein,
see Rowe, Discriminatory Sales of Comnodities in Commerce: Jurisdictional Criteria
Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 67 YALE L.J. 1155, 1160 & n22 (1958).
28. Lionel charged the same price to Klein's wholesaler and to the chains and mail-
order houses with whom Klein competed. Thus, for the purposes of this suit, a single price
policy existed. 237 F.2d at 14. But Lionel did not in fact sell to all direct purchasers at
the same price. Department stores and some miscellaneous accounts received a somewhat
higher price than the chains and wholesalers, but a lower price than plaintiff. Klein v.
Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D. Del. 1956). These prices were apparently
considered justifiable, see Lionel Corp. v. Klein, 114 A.2d 652, 656 (Del. Ch. 1955),
and were not at issue in this suit.
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on the rule that a single price to all direct purchasers does not violate Robinson-
Patman, the court affirmed dismissal of an indirect retailer's complaint without
ruling on an alleged resale price maintenance agreement between manufacturer
and wholesaler.29 The decision therefore implicitly sanctioned disparate re-
tailer costs flowing from distributor control of subsequent prices. Vertical price
fixing, however, is exempt from antitrust strictures only when embodied in
fair-trade agreements conforming with state law.30 And the Supreme Court
held in United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., that a state authorized
fair-trade agreement between a wholesaler and a manufacturer competing with
him in selling to retailers constitutes horizontal price fixing proscribed by the
Sherman Act.31 Hence, the manufacturer control of wholesale prices alleged
29. 237 F.2d at 15 n.2. The court said that Klein had no cause of action since he
was not a "purchaser." Generally, only direct buyers are recognized as purchasers. See,
e.g., Naifeh v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc., 218 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1954).
The court's language implies that § 2(a) not only describes what constitutes a violation
of the Robinson-Patman Act but also determines who has standing to sue in case of a
violation; that, by proscribing discrimination against a purchaser, the section allows
suit by purchasers only. See Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541, 543
(E.D.N.Y. 1957). But standing to sue is explicitly governed by § 4 of the Clayton Act,
which permits anyone injured to sue. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952). See
Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Ill. 1941); see also
E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944) ; Krug v. International Tel.
& Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956); McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach.
Co., 76 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1948); AusTin 11; Crowley, supra note 9, at 311.
Furthermore, no policy reasons appear for limiting suits to purchasers. See 70 HARv. L.
REv. 387, 390 (1956). The aim of the act, prevention of injury on all distributive levels,
AUsTIN 44, is best accomplished through allowing suit by any injured party who can
show injury to competition.
Thus, the Klein court's language probably went to the issue of whether plaintiff's
status as a nonpurchaser affected the existence of actionable discrimination, not the issue
of standing to sue. Unless some purchaser is discriminated against, the act is not violated,
and hence no cause of action accrues to either purchaser or nonpurchaser. See Bird &
Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548, 553 (1937). Since Klein was not a purchaser, no discrimination
existed against him. He could have alleged injury to himself through discrimination
against his wholesaler. See Shniderman, supra note 10, at 597; 70 HARv. L. RrT. 387,
390 (1956). But with the court recognizing the one-price rule, no discrimination existed
against the wholesaler either. Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560, 564 (D. Del. 1956).
The result was that actionable discrimination would exist only if Klein, an indirect buyer,
were deemed a purchaser since the price to him was higher than that charged his direct-
buying competitor. See note 28 supra.
30. The McGuire Act exempts from the Sherman Act those fair-trade agreements
made pursuant to state law which concern commodities sold in interstate commerce. 66
STAT. 631, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1952). The vast majority of states have fair-trade laws
with widely differing provisions. 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) Iffl 3003, 3005, 3006,
3008 (1957) (listing and describing state laws).
On fair trade generally, see Arr'y GEN. REP. 149-55; Fulda, Resale Price M1aintenance,
21 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 175 (1954); Rahl, Fair Trade Since the McGuire Amendment, in
MIcHr. SUMMER INST. ON INT'L & COMPAR. LAW, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 188 (1953);
Notes, 66 YALE L.J. 436 (1957), 69 HARv. L. REv. 316 (1955).
31. 351 U.S. 305 (1956). The McGuire Act explicitly denies fair-trade protection
to horizontal agreements between businesses competing with each other. "Nothing con-
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in Klein is illegal,3 2 for manufacturer and wholesaler both sold to retailers. 33
The decision's endorsement of the one-price rule in a controlled price context
nonetheless retains significance for other pricing arrangements valid under
antitrust criteria.
McKesson & Robbins doctrine restricts, but does not eliminate, the manu-
facturer's ability to use fair-trade agreements to control prices charged indirect
retailers. A primary seller is not covered by that doctrine when supplying
multilevel distribution systems, so long as he does not compete at the same
marketing level with a purchaser whose prices he controls.3 4 For example, if
the manufacturer markets through both wholesaler-large retailer and whole-
saler-jobber-small retailer, his regulation of wholesaler and jobber resale prices
and thus of prices to competing retailers may be valid under fair-trade law.3 5
tained in ... this subsection shall make lawful contracts or agreements providing for the
establishment or maintenance of minimum or stipulated resale prices . . . between manu-
facturers, or between producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between
factors, or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition with
each other." 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (5) (1952). The McKesson Court may have
overreached congressional intent by holding that the McGuire Act does not allow price
maintenance of the seller's own products on the same level on which he himself sells. See
351 U.S. at 316-20 (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.); Herman, Fair Trade and Mc-
Kesson & Robbins, 44 CALIF. L. Rav. 853, 860-65 (1956); Note, 25 FORDHA .L L. Rxv. 513
(1956) ; Comment, 24 U. CHI. L. RaV. 533, 535-36 n.16 (1957). Legislative reversal of
McKesson & Robbins is not unlikely, for Congress has in the past evidenced a desire to
overcome judicial weakening of fair-trade laws. See H.R. REP. No. 1437, 82nd Cong.,
2d Sess. (1952). See also H.R. 10527, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (bill would, inter alia,
limit application of McKesson & Robbins) ; N.Y. Times, May 26, 1958, p. 20, col. 5;
Note, Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-1957, 71 HARv. L. REV.
1324, 1334 (1958).
32. In the district court, plaintiff did not allege any specific control by the manu-
facturer over resale prices. Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560, 564 (D. Del. 1956).
The issue was raised on appeal when Klein deposed that Lionel controlled wholesale
prices through fair-trade agreements. Lionel denied having made such agreements. The
court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue because Klein was not a "purchaser." 237
F.2d at 15 n.2. See also note 29 supra.
33. 237 F.2d at 14.
34. The crucial issue in cases following McKesson & Robbins is whether parties to
a fair-trade agreement are in competition. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Secatore's, Inc., 246
F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1957) ; General Elec. Co. v. Hess Bros., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Pa.
1957) ; G. D. Searle & Co. v. Institutional Drug Distributors, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 715
(S.D. Cal. 1957). See note 31 supra. One commentator suggests that McKesson &
Robbins ought not to apply when the price setter competes with distributors "only by
performing similar functions solely with respect to its own manufactured products," but
should be limited to manufacturers who wholesale other producers' products competing
with their own. Comment, 24 U. CHI. L. Rv. 533, 542-43 (1957) ; see H.R. 10527, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
35. This marketing pattern is not uncommon. See, e.g., Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC,
238 F.2d 43, 46-47 (8th Cir. 1956) (producer-distributor-jobber-user); United States
Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489, 1502 (1939) (marketing tires through independent wholesalers
to retailers as well as through certain oil companies to jobbers to retail dealers) ; Fleming,
Group Buying Under the Robinson-Patman Act: The Automotive Parts Cases, 7 BUFFALO
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Resale price maintenance can also be achieved by methods other than fair-
trade arrangements. Using a subsidiary sales corporation to serve certain
retailing customers may enable an original seller corporation legally to set
different prices for the subsidiary's retailers than for its own.2 6 In addition,
Klein may shelter from Robinson-Patman suit certain indirect methods of price
fixing which, because insufficiently affected with a public interest, are not
actionable under other antitrust laws.8 7 Taken together, these permissible
L. REv. 231, 234 (1958) (automotive parts distribution involves producer, warehouse
distributor, jobber and sometimes an additional sub-jobber before the ultimate consumer) ;
Kelley, supra note 6, at 536 (author's distribution system examples four and eight) ; cf.
CONVERSE & HuEGY, THE ELEMENTS OF MARKETING 269 n.a (3d rev. ed. 1946) ; ZORN &
FELDMAN 183. The systems of distribution pertinent to this footnote all involve the "jobber,"
who apparently can only be distinguished as a "special type of wholesaler." McNAiR &
HANSEN, READINGS IN MARKETING 62 (2d ed. 1956).
36. See, e.g., Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
Philco, the parent company, sold directly to Davega, Baim's competitor, while Baim pur-
chased at a higher price from Philco Distributors, a wholly owned subsidiary. Despite
the fact that all but one of the subsidiary's directors were also directors of Philco, the
court refused to find that the subsidiary was merely the "alter ego of the parent" and
that parent and subsidiary "constitute a 'common seller' discriminating between their
customers." Id. at 544. See also National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F2d 825, 829 (7th Cir.
1955), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 419 (1957); Crowley, supra note 9, at 313-15;
Hamilton, Cost as a Standard for Price, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 321, 322 (1937). For
discussion of the Bain-type discrimination arrangement, see Rowe, Discriminatory Sales
of Commodities in Comnerce: Jurisdictional Criteria Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
67 YALE L.J. 1155, 1161-62 & n.26 (1958) ; see also Fleming, supra note 35, at 239; Note,
67 HARV. L. REV. 294, 305 (1953).
Generally, courts may ignore corporate entities when justice so requires. Owl Fumigat-
ing Corp. v. California Cyanide Co., 30 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1929). Corporate entities should
not be permitted to frustrate the purpose of regulatory statutes. If the court finds control
in fact exercised by the parent, the subsidiary's corporate entity will be disregarded. See
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Benson, 232 F.2d 554, 565 (2d Cir. 1956); Standard
Motor Products, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) ff 26960 (FTC Jan. 20, 1958) ;
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 305-06 (rev. ed. 1946); cf. Eastern Industries, Inc. v. Traffic
Controls, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D. Del. 1956). Thus, even where the subsidiary
is the seller, the independent retailer might be considered a direct buyer of the parent. If
so, the retailer would have a § 2(a) action as a discriminated against purchaser when
his prices were higher than those charged his competitors buying directly from the
parent. On corporate entities generally, see BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra at 287-332;
STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 85-99 (2d ed. 1949).
37. Injury to competition under Robinson-Patman usually may be demonstrated by
showing injury to an individual competitor. The Sherman Act, however, requires proof
of injury to competition in general. See notes 4 and 6 supra; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469, 500-01 (1940) ; Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670, 674-75 (S.D. Cal.
1951). See also ATT'y GEN. REP. 164-67.
Various indirect forms of price control may be legal under the Sherman Act. United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (refusal to sell permitted even though it
resulted in then unsanctioned resale price maintenance); Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121,
1122 (1949) ("the producer may 'suggest' the proper resale price, cutting off any distribu-
tors who disregard his suggestion"). But see FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S.
441 (1922) (limiting Colgate) ; Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1125-29 (1949). On refusals
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ways of controlling intermediary prices to retailers indicate the reach of the
Klein extension of the one-price rule.
Whenever distributors exercise effective control over prices to competitors,
application of the one-price rule is both unnecessary and harmful. Standard
Oil, although approving the single-price doctrine, apparently adopted the view
that Robinson-Patman, by favoring equal prices to competing resellers, imposed
responsibility for securing that equality on the original seller.38 It was in the
absence of control that the court further suggested a single price for all direct
purchasers as a means of discharging the seller's statutory duty.39 On the
other hand, when the seller enforces resale price maintenance, as alleged in
Klein, the one-price rule constitutes a gratuitous escape from his duty.40 And
application of the rule in this context is trebly pernicious. First, a manufacturer
can engage in economic discrimination by granting middlemen the same price
as direct-buying retailers. Second, since the manufacturer fixes the prices
charged by middlemen, he can determine the exact quantum of the discrimina-
tory differential against indirect buyers. Third, when he also sets the resale
prices of indirect retailers, he can manipulate their profit margins.41 In sum,
to sell in general, see note 18 supra. The possibility of exercising indirect control is
illustrated by Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937). Kraft sold directly to
retailers and, using suggested price lists, set the price at which wholesalers resold to
retailers. Since no fair-trade agreement existed, McKesson & Robbins would not have
applied. See note 31 supra. Although Kraft's wholesale price control might have violated
the Sherman Act, determining the existence of an agreement under antitrust laws is diffi-
cult. See Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 942 (1950) (reasonable jury could not have found agreement on basis of circum-
stantial evidence presented); cf. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Texas, 154 Tex. 573, 280
S.W.2d 723 (1955) (circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove agreement under state
law). Thus, the difficulties involved in proving an agreement restricts the application of
the Sherman Act, even where price control, as in Kraft, is no less real than that achieved
by fair-trade agreements and prohibited under McKesson & Robbins.
38. 173 F.2d at 217. See note 16 supra.
39. 173 F.2d at 217. See text at note 19 supra. See also Bayly, Four Years Under the
Robinson-Pathan Act, 25 MINN. L. REV. 131, 149 (1941).
40. See notes 21-25 supra and accompanying text.
41. When the manufacturer exercises control over wholesale or subsidiary resale prices,
he effectively determines the amount of the excess price charged the indirect-buying retailer
over that paid by the direct buyer. This control in effect eliminates wholesaler
competition and its advantages to the indirect retailer. When wholesale price control
exists alone, the indirect retailer is still free to attempt to nullify the differential through
a higher volume of sales. He might do this by selling at a lower price and accepting lower
profit margins than his direct-buying competitor. However, when the manufacturer con-
trols both the price the indirect retailer must pay and also the price at which he sells, the
effect upon the indirect retailer is more severe since the manufacturer can then effectively
regulate and hence reduce the indirect retailer's profit margin. Cf. United States v. Mc-
Kesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 315-16 n.20 (1956) ; Kelley, Functional Discounts
Under the Robinson-Pat man Act, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 526, 548, 556 (1952). But cf. Herman,
supra note 31, at 861.
Although economic discrimination may result from the one-price policy, see notes 23-24
supra and accompanying text, its effects may not be severe in a noncontrol situation.
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overruling Klein is indicated to accord the indirect retailer a section 2 (a) cause
of action for injury from seller price control on different distributive levels. 42
Even in noncontrol situations, ease of administering the one-price rule may
not justify its failure to achieve the act's policy of equal prices to competitors.48
Availability of another standard which accomplishes effective yet equitable
seller responsibility for this policy suggests discarding the one-price rule alto-
gether. Courts could hold sellers generally responsible for ensuring price
equality to competitors," but allow appropriate seller discounts to buyers on
intermediate levels of distribution.45 Accordingly, if a court found that the
The indirect-buying retailer obviously pays a higher price than his direct-buying com-
petitor. But, absent control, competition among wholesalers tends to reduce the differential
paid by the indirect retailer. Moreover, wholesalers not dealing exclusively in the primary
seller's product might find it advantageous to bear the whole burden of the differential
themselves in order to retain retailer goodwill, thus destroying the price advantage on
that product given the direct-buying retailer. Furthermore, the direct-buying retailer may
be performing certain functions for the seller which the combined wholesaler to indirect
retailer system does not perform. These would tend to mitigate the advantage of his
lower price. See Note, 67 HARV. L. Rv. 294, 303 (1953).
42. When subsidiary control exists, the retailer buying from the subsidiary should
be permitted to sue for discrimination against him on the theory that parent and subsidiary
are in effect a common seller. See note 36 supra. Thus, the common seller would be held
liable for any price differences among retailers purchasing from either the parent or the
subsidiary.
When control is otherwise evidenced, the indirect retailer should be considered a
"purchaser." See Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937) ; AUSTIN 37; Bayly,
supra note 39, at 149-51; see also note 29 supra. Thus, any differential between the price
he pays and that charged his direct-buying competitors would constitute prima facie
discrimination, permitting anyone injured to sue under § 4 of the Clayton Act. The seller
would then be unable to insulate himself from liability by charging the same price to
wholesalers and direct-buying retailers.
For a discussion of proposed legislation designed to overrule Klein, see Rowe, Dis-
criminatory Sales of Comnwdities in Commerce: Jurisdictional Criteria Under the Robin-
son-Patinan Act, 67 YALE L.J. 1155-1160 n.21 (1958).
43. See notes 21-22, 25 supra and accompanying text. For a legislative attempt to
override the one-price rule, see H.R. 10304, 10305, S. 3654, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958),
discussed in Rowe, Discriminatory Sales of Comnwdities in Commerce: Jurisdictional
Criteria Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 67 YALE L.J. 1155, 1160 n.21; see also note 45
infra.
44. Lower courts are not bound by Standard Oil's one-price rationale since the Su-
preme Court in twice reviewing that case did not affirm the doctrine. Standard Oil Co.
v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951.); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958). Both of
these decisions concerned a "good-faith" defense. Eventually, Standard's discounts to whole-
salers were justified as good-faith lowering of prices to meet competition. The circuit
court's statements on seller responsibility and the one-price rule were therefore never
affirmed. Lower courts have, however, implemented the one-price rule. See, e.g., Klein v.
Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956); Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F.
Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
45. Even the court in Standard refused to subject the seller to absolute liability for
price disparities on subsequent levels. The seller was to be held liable only if he sold to
a wholesaler he "knows or ought to have known" would undercut the price to the direct
retailer. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210, 217 (7th Cir. 1949) (modifying the FTC
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price charged middlemen was reasonably calculated to enable them to resell
at a price commensurate with that charged direct-buying retailers, the primary
seller would not be accountable for the competitive consequences of the resale
prices of his middlemen.46 The primary seller would be liable only if he
granted discounts which he knew or should have known would ordinarily
result in disparate prices to competing distributors. 47 Illegal discrimination
would therefore no longer be inferred merely from different prices to direct
purchasers.
The proposed competitors price rule substitutes flexible analysis for the
rigidity of the one-price formula in order to effectuate the primary Robinson-
Patman policy of equal prices to competing resellers. Nevertheless, economic
discrimination would occur whenever the same price was charged competitors
performing different marketing functions.48 This shortcoming, common to all
rules manifesting price equalization policy alone, could be remedied through
broadened recognition of the act's secondary goal-efficient marketing. By
more ready acceptance of cost justification as a defense, courts could enable
sellers to operate outside the proposed rule if necessary to avoid economic
cease and desist order, Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263, 284-85 (1945), which made the
seller absolutely responsible).
Recently introduced legislation, H.R. 10304, 10305, S. 3654, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958),
would overrule the one-price doctrine without imposing seller responsibility. The new
bills, amending Robinson-Patman § 2(a), proscribe as discriminatory a seller's "failure
to impose differentials in price as between purchasers in different functional classes."
Thus, while the legislation promotes special wholesaler discounts, it does not make the
seller responsible for granting discounts which induce wholesalers to resell at a price
lower than that charged the direct-buying retailer.
46. Cf. Bayly, supra note 39, at 150; Kelley, supra note 41, at 555; Note, 67 HARv.
L. REv. 294, 317 (1953).
Seller responsibility for differentials on subsequent distribution levels may have been
the basis for the decision in Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230
(D.N.J. 1956). There, the court held that Krug, a wholesaler, had a cause of action
against IT&T for granting a direct-buying retailer a lower price than that charged Krug.
The injury to Krug was derivative since based on the effect that IT&T's pricing policies
had on Krug's retailers. See 70 HARv. L. Rav. 387 (1956).
"It has been suggested that an eventual result of this recent trend may be that the Com-
mission will be forced by the logic of its reasoning to pass on the size of functional differ-
entials, i.e., how much off to wholesalers over retailers-in order to ensure that such
differentials do not injure retailers." Van Cise, Functional Prices, in NEw You STATE
BAR Ass'N, 1947 ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYmPosIum 89, 97 (but the author disapproved
such "an eventual result").
47. This solution resembles that first suggested in Standard Oil but later never fol-
lowed because of resort to the one-price rule. See note 45 supra. Under the proposed
solution, a seller would not be liable if the discount were normal and therefore did not
induce the price cut. See Van Cise, supra note 46, at 92, 96 (1947) ; Cf. Rowe, The Evolution
of the Robinson-Patinan Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 CoLum. L. Ray. 1059, 1083
(1957).
48. Economic discrimination occurs whenever two purchasers performing marketing
functions of unequal value for their common seller pay him an identical price. A7r'y GN.
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discrimination.49 The amount of protection afforded independent retailers
against lower prices to their integrated competitors would then depend on
judicial standards for determining economically permissible discounts. Re-
sultant interaction of cost defenses with the recommended competitors price
rule should adequately protect independent retailers while simultaneously
favoring distributive efficiency. The conflicting aims of the act would thus be
balanced to permit a more rational price structure for multistage marketing.
REP. 333; Adelman, Price Discrimination as Treated in the Attorney General's Report,
104 U. PA. L. Ray. 222, 223 (1955).
49. At present, the cost justification defense is practically unavailable because courts
narrowly define relevant costs. See note 8 supra. For a recent decision which may portend
a relaxation of the judicial attitude toward cost justification, see Simplicity Pattern Co.
v. FTC, Civil No. 13884, D.C. Cir., May 29, 1.958.
